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[21] 
THE ENDS AND MEANS OF DECARBONIZATION: THE 
GREEN NEW DEAL IN CONTEXT 
BY 
JONAS J. MONAST 
Disputes about climate policy involve much more than whether 
or not to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is general 
agreement among proponents of climate policy that strategies 
should be cost effective, address distributional impacts, and  
incentivize investments in low-carbon technologies. Yet 
disagreements abound regarding additional goals of climate policy 
design. 
Decarbonizing the economy means changing the sources of 
energy we use, how we transport people and products, how we 
produce food, and which resources we consume. Yet even among 
proponents of federal climate legislation there is strong 
disagreement regarding policy instruments. Recent proposals for a 
revenue-neutral carbon tax and a Green New Deal (GND) frame the 
opposite ends of the debate. On one end, the GND framework treats 
climate policy as an opportunity to steer the trajectory of the U.S. 
economy while also correcting social and environmental injustices. 
Proponents of the most expansive iterations of a GND argue that it 
is not possible to separate justice and economic considerations from 
environmental policy. At the other end of the spectrum, revenue-
neutral carbon tax proposals reject the creation of new government 
programs and focus on controlling greenhouse gas emissions rather 
than the economic and social impacts of the policy.  
This Essay identifies core disputes about the non-emission 
goals in state and federal climate policy debates that create barriers 
to legislative consensus. The Essay begins with a comparison of 
recent proposals to mitigate climate change, including pricing 
carbon via a carbon market or carbon tax, regulatory measures such 
as the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, state-based policies, and the 
GND. It then identifies three conflicts, the resolution of which will 
 
C. Boyden Gray Distinguished Fellow and Assistant Professor, University of North 
Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to participants in the 2019 Southern Environmental 
Law Scholars workshop and the Vermont Law Review conference Legal Frameworks for a 
Green New World: Breathing Life Into the Goals of the Green New Deal for providing 
valuable feedback on early drafts of this Essay. 
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shape future climate policy developments: the role of 
decarbonization as technology policy, social justice policy, and fiscal 
policy. Deploying low carbon technologies is a critical piece of the 
climate mitigation puzzle, but stakeholders disagree whether 
decarbonization strategies should prioritize renewable energy or 
include technologies such as nuclear or carbon capture. Each policy 
discussed in this Essay considers some range of social impacts (at 
minimum, cost increases), but differ significantly about which social 
impacts to address and the how to address them. The policies also 
adopt different approaches to the link between fiscal policy and 
climate policy, with some generating revenue to fund new 
government programs, some returning revenue to U.S. citizens, and 
some not addressing the issue. The Essay concludes with comments 
about the early impacts of the GND on the domestic policy debate 
and opportunities to resolve it.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, a new coalition of environmental and social justice 
advocates launched the Green New Deal (GND)—a sweeping framework 
to mitigate climate change, reduce unemployment, and address other 
longstanding social justice and environmental challenges. The GND 
quickly became a focal point in the climate policy debate as a new wave 
of congressional candidates gave voice to the ideas.1  
The GND refocused national attention on climate change, but it 
also reinforced the lack of consensus about the proper approach to 
mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. At the same time that the 
GND was emerging as a new force in the climate policy debate, 
 
 1 See, e.g., RHIANA GUNN-WRIGHT & ROBERT HOCKETT, NEW CONSENSUS, THE GREEN 
NEW DEAL 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/V7QB-KGGT (describing the origins of the GND).  
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bipartisan bills were introduced in the House and Senate as companion 
bills to create a national cap-and-dividend program that would tax 
carbon and redistribute the funds back to taxpayers—the first 
bipartisan climate bill introduced in the U.S. Congress since 2010.2 
A coalition of companies, environmental organizations, and former 
elected officials and high-ranking cabinet officials released a proposal 
supporting a similar approach.3 In January 2019, over 3,500 economists 
endorsed an editorial published in the Wall Street Journal promoting a 
similar idea.4  
A revenue-neutral carbon tax and a GND reflect opposite ends of 
the climate policy spectrum. On one end, the GND framework 
approaches climate policy as an opportunity to steer the trajectory of the 
U.S. economy while also correcting social and environmental injustices. 
At the other end of the spectrum, revenue-neutral carbon tax proposals 
adopt a more traditional approach to environmental policy. These 
proposals focus on controlling a class of pollutants rather than the 
economic and social impacts of the policy.  
The contrast between the GND and carbon tax proposals highlight 
a challenge that has long frustrated efforts to decarbonize the economy: 
some of the most consequential disagreements about climate policy are 
not simply about the best way to reduce the atmospheric concentration 
of GHGs. Instead, the conflicts are rooted in fundamentally different 
views of the role of government. Achieving the broad-based political 
coalition to move climate change legislation through Congress requires 
addressing these core conflicts.  
Decarbonizing the economy means changing how we power the 
economy, transport people and products, produce food, and consume 
other natural resources. There is general agreement that climate policy 
should be cost effective, should address distributional impacts, and 
should incentivize investments in low carbon technologies. Yet 
disagreements abound regarding the scope of the problem and the 
appropriate responses. Should climate policy allow compliance flexibility 
or mandate emission reductions at each facility subject to the policy? 
Should climate policy directly address job losses that will occur as the 
 
 2 See Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, H.R. 7173, 115th Cong. 
(2018); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791, 115th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (2018); Noah Kaufman, A Comparison of the Bipartisan Energy Innovation and 
Carbon Dividend Act with other Carbon Tax Proposals 2, 4 (Columbia Univ., Ctr. on Glob. 
Energy Policy, Working Paper, 2018), https://perma.cc/6MMK-N68B. The bill was 
reintroduced at the start of the 116th Congress. Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
Act of 2019, H.R.763, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 3 See The Four Pillars of Our Carbon Dividends Plan, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, 
https://perma.cc/N7Y9-KHFN (updated September 2019) [hereinafter CLC Carbon 
Dividend Plan].  
 4 Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/73S3-KY9J. The Climate Leadership Council claims that this is “the 
largest public statement of economists in history.” Economists’ Statement on Carbon 
Dividends, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/9H9S-EQ5X (last visited Nov. 
25, 2019).  
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energy system moves toward a lower carbon future? Should 
decarbonization policy ensure that new infrastructure does not create 
long-term public health and environmental burdens for local 
communities? Perhaps most fundamentally, is decarbonization about 
pollution mitigation alone, or should it also address the social impacts 
resulting from the transition to a low carbon economy?  
Policy debates often treat these as questions of strategy (in other 
words, the means of decarbonizing). This Essay argues that the 
disagreements reflect different views about the core goals of 
decarbonization rather than merely the strategies for reducing 
emissions. Different stakeholders expect fundamentally different 
outcomes and define success in sometimes vastly different terms. Some 
expect climate policy to correct past economic and environmental 
injustices. Some seek to rigidly define the scope of acceptable energy 
technologies while others are agnostic regarding technology choices as 
long as the policy results in lower overall GHG emissions over time. 
Some prioritize reducing economic burdens on the new policy but give 
less attention to other social goals.5  
Proponents of the most expansive iterations of a GND argue that it 
is not possible to separate justice and economic considerations from 
environmental policy, and that politics and equity require addressing 
the economic impacts of climate policy as part of a comprehensive 
decarbonization effort.6 Decarbonizing the economy necessarily means 
that some jobs will disappear and some communities will suffer 
economic blows. This is already taking place, as coal-fired power plants, 
and the mines supplying their coal, shutter due to low costs of natural 
gas and renewable energy.7 The GND takes this challenge on directly by 
combining climate policy, economic development, and job guarantees.8  
Carbon tax and cap-and-dividend proposals generally include 
provisions to help low-income citizens cope with higher energy prices 
resulting from the carbon price, but most do not focus on social, 
economic, or environmental justice issues.9 For some, the narrow focus 
 
 5 This is not to suggest that proponents of different policy mechanisms care more or 
less about the particular goals. They may support all of the goals identified in this Essay 
but believe that it is a better strategy choice to address other goals using other policy 
mechanisms, for example. 
 6 GUNN-WRIGHT & HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 7.  
 7 ETHAN BLUMENTHAL, UNC CENTER FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY, ENVT., AND ECON., 
COMMUNITIES IN TRANSITION: STATE RESPONSES TO ENERGY-SECTOR JOB LOSSES 3–7 
(2019), https://perma.cc/M7YM-PMW2.  
 8 GREG CARLOCK & EMILY MANGAN, DATA FOR PROGRESS, A GREEN NEW DEAL 2 
(2018), https://perma.cc/9LVQ-4T2S (“The goal of a Green New Deal is to build the 21st 
century economy, which by design will mitigate the causes of climate change while 
building resilience to its effects, restore the American landscape, and improve access to 
clean air and water—all in ways that prioritize justice and equity, and grow the economy 
and jobs.”). 
 9 See, e.g., GEORGE P. SCHULTZ & TED HALSTEAD, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE 
DIVIDEND ADVANTAGE 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/8EKG-WYKM (stating that “[c]ombining 
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on mitigating climate change may reflect a political calculation. Climate 
change is such a critical threat that a targeted response that has a 
better chance of collecting the necessary votes in Congress is a 
preferable option. For others, the focus on emissions reflects the view 
that the critical issue at hand is reducing emissions, not using climate 
policy as a legislative vehicle to tackle a host of other societal 
challenges. In other words, there is not consensus about whether some 
of the social justice issues included in the GND resolution are issues 
that government should address and, if they are, whether they should 
be directly linked to climate change mitigation.  
The Essay begins with a comparison of recent proposals to mitigate 
climate change, including pricing carbon via a carbon market or carbon 
tax, regulatory measures such as the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, 
state-based policies, and the GND.10 It then discusses three important 
conflicts, the resolution of which will shape future climate policy 
developments: the role of decarbonization as technology policy, social 
justice policy, and fiscal policy. Deploying low carbon technologies is a 
critical piece of the climate mitigation puzzle, but stakeholders disagree 
whether decarbonization strategies should prioritize renewable energy 
or include technologies such as nuclear or carbon capture. Each policy 
discussed in this Essay considers some range of social impacts (at 
minimum, cost increases), but they differ significantly about which 
social impacts to address and the how to address them. The policies 
adopt different approaches to the link between fiscal policy and climate 
policy, with some explicitly using revenue to fund new government 
programs, some explicitly rejecting creation of new government 
programs, and some not addressing the issue. The Essay concludes with 
comments about the early impacts of the GND on the domestic policy 
debate. Whether one agrees with the GND framework or not, the 
proposal helped launch the most serious national debate about climate 
policy since the U.S. House of Representatives passed climate legislation 
in 2009.11 The long-term impact of the GND will depend on whether its 
 
carbon fees with dividends solves [the problem of imposing a disproportionate burden on 
the least fortunate] and ensures that the most vulnerable come out ahead”).  
 10 This Essay focuses on state and federal policies specifically targeting greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, but the list only scratches the surface of policy options for mitigating 
climate change. For example, renewable energy mandates are important elements in New 
York’s and California’s pledges to reach carbon neutrality before the middle of the 21st 
century. Jaclyn Brandt, New York Governor Unveils Plan to Double Solar Goal and 
Expand Wind, DAILY ENERGY INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/E35M-MD6X (“The 
cornerstone of this new goal is an increase of New York’s successful Clean Energy 
Standard mandate from 50 percent to 70 percent renewable electricity by 2030.” (quoting 
New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo)); California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program: 
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, S.B. 100, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). A new book 
published by the Environmental Law Institute catalogues “over one thousand legal 
options” to reduce U.S. GHG emissions. LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach, eds., 2018). 
 11 See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: ‘Let a Thousand Climate Proposals Bloom.’ 
Lawmakers Tee Up GND Alternatives, WASH. POST: POWER POST (Mar. 26, 2019), 
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proponents treat the framework as a single, comprehensive legislative 
package or as a set of goals that could apply to different types of policy 
proposals.  
II. DEFINING THE GREEN NEW DEAL 
The dominant paradigm for climate policy design assumes that 
there is agreement on the end goals (decarbonization), and the 
disagreements involve differing viewpoints regarding policy instruments 
(e.g., carbon taxes, cap-and-trade programs, mandates, etc.), scope (e.g., 
sector-specific or economy-wide), stringency, and timelines. Climate 
policy options are often evaluated based on their impacts on 
environmental performance, cost effectiveness, distributional impacts, 
and political viability. Many stakeholders often rely on economic 
modeling to assess the costs and impacts of different GHG-reduction 
pathways and use the results to support a particular emission reduction 
strategy.  
The GND starts from a different place. Rather than focusing 
primarily (or exclusively) on pollution abatement, the GND approaches 
the challenge of climate change as part of a much broader socio-
economic challenge.12 GND advocates argue that the energy system and 
the economy are at a turning point, and seek to steer both arenas 
toward a more just, lower carbon future. The strategy combines the need 
to address climate change, the economic opportunities created by 
developing and deploying a new generation of energy technologies, the 
historic exclusion of many communities in environmental policy design, 
and the need for stable employment with meaningful wages and 
benefits. 
As of the drafting of this Essay, the GND is a conceptual framework 
rather than a fully formed legislative proposal. GND proponents in 
Congress have yet to specify how they would address the challenging 
fiscal and social tradeoffs inherent in such a broad policy change such as 
the role of nuclear power, the policy mechanisms to achieve the emission 
reductions, and how to fund the proposals.  
As a result, the GND acts like a climate version of a Rorschach test, 
with proponents and opponents seizing on certain details (or lack 
thereof) to extrapolate what the entire concept stands for, from a call for 
100% renewable energy to hyperbolic claims that the GND is a “Trojan 
Horse for socialism,” or that it will require everyone to become 
vegetarians and cease all air travel.13 It is also unclear at this stage 
 
https://perma.cc/KY4K-VPEA; American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009). 
 12 CARLOCK & MANGAN, supra note 8, at 1 (characterizing the GND as “a transition to 
the 21st century economy”).  
 13 See Annalee Monroe, President Trump is Partly Right About the Democrats’ Green 
New Deal, ARIZ. CENT.: FACT CHECK, https://perma.cc/3N97-2VPB (last updated Mar. 18, 
2019); David Harsanyi, The 10 Most Insane Requirements of the Green New Deal, THE 
EXEC REVIEW.MONAST (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2020  10:06 AM 
2020] THE ENDS AND MEANS OF DECARBONIZATION 27 
whether the GND is a specific proposal or a set of guiding principles to 
inform energy, environmental, and social policy at all levels of 
government. The distinction matters. If the GND is a set of guiding 
principles, policymakers can approach the GND in steps and incorporate 
the goals into numerous existing policy proposals. If it is a single policy 
proposal, the success or failure depends on the ability to move a specific 
legislative package through the U.S. Congress or state legislatures. 
The lack of details did not prevent the idea from breathing new life 
into the domestic climate policy debate, however. Almost as soon as the 
GND entered the national conscience, the race was on to define it. An 
early GND outline released by the Sunrise Movement, a leading 
proponent of the GND (and youth movement), advocated for Congress to 
create a new “select committee” to develop draft legislation to 
implement the GND.14 The Sunrise Proposal called for “[d]ramatically 
expand[ing] existing renewable power sources and deploy[ing] new 
production capacity.”15 Although it calls for “meeting 100% of national 
power demand through renewable sources,” the proposal does not 
require that outcome.16 Other language calls for “eliminating 
greenhouse gas emissions” from transportation, manufacturing, 
agriculture, “and other industries,” but the provisions do not specify 
technologies for achieving the goals.17 
Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey introduced a 
non-binding congressional resolution in February 2019 that 
incorporated much of the Sunrise Foundation’s framework.18 The 
resolution’s “whereas” clauses point to declining life expectancy, wage 
stagnation, a range of social and economic injustices, and threats to 
national security.19 Responding to these challenges, the GND calls for a 
“10-year national mobilization” to achieve net-zero GHG emissions, 
create jobs, invest in sustainable infrastructure and industries, secure 
clean air and water (and other necessities to ensure health and 
environmental protection), and promote justice and equity.20  
 
FEDERALIST,  https://perma.cc/3K89-URP7 (last visited Oct. 17, 2019); Thomas J. 
Donohue, The Green New Deal Is a Trojan Horse for Socialism, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE (Feb. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/AAU2-VG42. 
 14 DRAFT TEXT FOR PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO HOUSE RULES FOR 116TH CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, https://perma.cc/CK46-RJVU; see also Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s 
Platform, OCASIO 2018, https://perma.cc/9DVN-6UMT (last visited Oct.15, 2019) (U.S. Rep. 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez incorporated the GND into her campaign platform).  
 15 DRAFT TEXT FOR PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO HOUSE RULES FOR 116TH CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, § (6)(A)(i) (Committees, Commissions, and House 
Offices). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. § (6)(A)(iv)–(v) (Committees, Commissions, and House Offices). 
 18 Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal, H.R. 
Res. 109, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019) [hereinafter Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND 
Resolution]. 
 19 Id. at 3–4. 
 20 Id. at 5–6. 
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References to the GND in this Essay refer to the Ocasio-Cortez–
Markey Resolution unless otherwise noted, but it is far from the only 
version. Thomas Friedman proposed a GND in a 2007 New York Times 
column.21 President Barack Obama incorporated the concept into his 
2008 presidential campaign and incorporated elements of a GND 
approach into the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by 
linking economic recovery with large investments in clean energy 
technologies.22 Numerous commenters have published recent editorials 
promoting various strategies for the GND.23 Proponents, critics, and 
2020 Democratic presidential candidates continue debating the proper 
scope of a GND and the merits of policy ambition versus pragmatism.24 
New York adopted a narrower GND strategy that promotes renewable 
energy and energy innovation and articulates a list of specific policy 
goals.25 The state strategy follows recent announcements that the 
renewable energy would make up seventy percent of the state’s 
electricity mix by 2030 and that the electricity sector would be carbon-
neutral by 2040.26  
III. THE GREEN NEW DEAL IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S. CLIMATE POLICY 
The GND refocused national attention on climate change in the 
early days of the 116th Congress, but it also highlights the lack of 
consensus about the core goals for climate policy. As the GND entered 
the nation’s lexicon, the Climate Leadership Council (CLC)—a 
bipartisan advocacy group with corporate members as well as prominent 
scientists, economists, and former high-ranking government officials—
called for implementing a national carbon tax that returned tax revenue 
to U.S. citizens.27 Lawmakers in the House of Representatives and 
 
 21 Thomas L. Friedman, A Warning from the Garden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2007),  
https://perma.cc/M2CB-94AT.  
 22 David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOX, https://perma.cc/R5FX-6V8V 
(last updated Mar. 30, 2019) (providing a brief summary of the evolution of the GND 
concept).  
 23 See Noah Smith, The Green New Deal Would Spend the U.S. Into Oblivion, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/5XK9-5TBT; Thomas L. Friedman, The Green 
New Deal Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/23DL-UD8Z.  
 24 Samuel Whillans, Many Shades of the Green New Deal, THE REGULATORY REVIEW 
(Dec. 12, 2019), (describing Democratic presidential candidates’ climate platforms), https:// 
https://perma.cc/ZF7R-MHW8; Emily Holden, What is the Green New Deal and is It 
Technically Possible?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2018),  https://perma.cc/8PAK-B6UL.  
 25 GOV. ANDREW M. CUOMO, NEW YORK STATE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND RACIAL JUSTICE 
AGENDA: 2019 STATE OF THE STATE 312–29 (2019) [hereinafter N.Y. 2019 STATE OF THE 
STATE], https://perma.cc/5AG6-NU8P; Governor Cuomo Announces Green New Deal 
Included in 2019 Executive Budget, N.Y. STATE (Jan. 17, 2019),  https://perma.cc/BCK7-
DFGX; see also Howie Hawkins, The Green New Deal New York Needs, From Its Original 
Source, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/D9ER-4DVW (criticizing Gov. 
Cuomo’s GND for not going far enough). 
 26 N.Y. 2019 STATE OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 315. 
 27 CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3.  
EXEC REVIEW.MONAST (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2020  10:06 AM 
2020] THE ENDS AND MEANS OF DECARBONIZATION 29 
Senate introduced companion bipartisan bills to establish a cap-and-
dividend strategy similar to that proposed by the CLC.28 In contrast to 
the GND’s broad approach to addressing climate change and social 
justice, the cap-and-dividend legislation focuses on GHG emissions 
exclusively. Rather than utilizing tax revenues to fund job creation and 
technology innovation, for example, the cap-and-dividend approach 
returns revenues collected through the program back to consumers 
rather than create new government programs.  
This Part provides an overview of two general climate policy 
strategies implemented or proposed in the last decade—carbon pricing 
and regulatory mandates—and discusses their similarities and 
differences with the GND.29 Beyond the core trait that these policies 
share in common—reducing GHG emissions—they aim to achieve very 
different outcomes. Some focus primarily on GHG emissions. Some seek 
to reduce energy and environmental burdens faced by underserved 
communities. All seek to incentivize investment in new zero-carbon 
generation, but some mandate specific energy technologies while others 
focus on emission levels rather than technologies. Most, but not all, aim 
to address the distributional impacts of policies that increase energy 
prices.30 Part III builds upon this overview by exposing the underlying 
conflicts inherent in the climate policy strategies discussed here. 
A. Pricing Carbon 
Market mechanisms—carbon markets and carbon taxes—have 
dominated the domestic climate policy debate. Coupling a price on 
carbon with compliance flexibility allows firms with high abatement 
costs to continue emitting GHGs and pay the price (by purchasing cap-
and-trade allowances or paying the carbon tax). Firms with lower 
abatement costs may reduce their emissions and thus avoid paying the 
carbon price (by avoiding the carbon tax or the need to purchase 
allowances, or by selling the allowance in a carbon market). Market-
based policies are generally agnostic regarding whether individual 
facilities reduce emissions or pay the carbon price. As long as the 
emissions cap or carbon tax are set at an appropriate level, overall 
emissions should drop over time.  
The 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman–
Markey Bill), introduced by then-Representatives Henry Waxman and 
 
 28 Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, H.R. 7173, 115th Cong., 2d 
Sess. §§ 9902, 9512 (2018); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791, 
115th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 9902, 9512 (2018). 
 29 This list only scratches the surface of options for reducing emissions. It does not 
include tax incentives or research and development funding, for example. A new book 
published by the Environmental Law Institute catalogues “over one thousand legal 
options” to reduce U.S. GHG emissions. LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 1. 
 30 Id. 
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Edward Markey, remains the high-water mark for the federal climate 
policy debate. The bill, which passed the U.S. House of Representatives 
but did not come up for a vote in the U.S. Senate, would have 
established a nationwide carbon market with an emissions cap that 
became more stringent over time and provided funding to support 
multiple policy goals via allowance auction revenue.31 The bill included 
specific rules for allowance allocation and auctioning, mechanisms to 
protect energy-intensive industries whose competitiveness could be 
jeopardized by higher energy prices resulting from the carbon price, 
offsets provisions, and a market oversight regime.32 The Waxman–
Markey Bill also included a federal renewable portfolio standard, energy 
efficiency incentives, and other policies to support energy innovation.33 
Although the Waxman–Markey Bill did not become law, two state-
based carbon markets are currently operating, one in Northeastern and 
Mid-Atlantic states and the other in California.34 The states 
participating in these markets supplement the carbon price with 
renewable portfolio standards and other incentives to encourage 
deployment of clean energy technologies.35  
The CLC and Washington State carbon dividend proposals are the 
latest developments in carbon pricing proposals.36 They build upon cap-
and-dividend legislation introduced in 2009 by U.S. Senators Maria 
Cantwell and Susan Collins. That bill called for an 83% reduction in 
GHG emissions between 2005 and 2050.37 If enacted, the Cantwell–
Collins bill would have established a “Carbon Revenue Trust Fund” to 
return 74% of the revenue to U.S. citizens.38  
The CLC proposal calls for an initial $40 per ton carbon tax that 
increases over time.39 The plan, which the CLC promotes as a 
“conservative climate solution,” rejects creating new government 
programs. Instead, the CLC calls for returning revenue to all American 
citizens “on an equal and monthly basis.”40 The proposal also calls for a 
border tax adjustment to protect domestic companies that may be 
 
 31 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman–Markey Bill), H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong. § 721 (2009). 
 32 Id. §§ 241–43, 721–24, 731, 732.  
 33 Id. tit. I–II. 
 34 Letter from RGGI Member States, to Members of Congress (Oct. 31, 2007); CAL. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., OVERVIEW OF ARB EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM 
(2015), https://perma.cc/HZJ5-BFZD. 
 35 Renewables Portfolio Standard—RPS, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 
https://perma.cc/7PQN-A39A (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (“The Renewables Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) is one of California’s key programs for advancing renewable energy.”). 
 36 CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3; Initiative Measure No. 1631 (Wash. 
2018), https://perma.cc/A4QR-TXTK. 
 37 Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 38 Id. § 2. 
 39 JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE 
CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017). 
 40 Id.  
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vulnerable to competition with imported goods from countries without 
similar carbon prices.41 The final prong of the CLC proposal—
preempting state climate policies, preventing lawsuits based on a 
company’s contribution to climate change, and scaling back some 
existing environmental regulations42—may prove far more controversial, 
as it aims to trade climate policy for existing protections against 
harmful pollutants.  
Lawmakers in the House of Representatives and Senate introduced 
bipartisan companion bills to establish a cap-and-dividend strategy 
similar to the carbon dividend approach proposed by the CLC.43 In 
contrast to the GND’s broad approach to addressing climate change and 
social justice, the cap-and-dividend legislation is an example of a 
narrower focus on GHG emissions specifically and represents a strategy 
choice to return revenues collected through to the program back to 
consumers rather than create new government programs.  
Despite the renewed enthusiasm for taxing carbon in some 
Washington, D.C. circles, failed carbon tax ballot measures in 
Washington State in 2016 and 2018 are sobering reminders of the 
hurdles facing climate policy proposals.44 The 2016 proposal would have 
used carbon tax revenues to reduce income taxes.45 The 2018 measure 
took a different approach. Rather than using the carbon tax to offset 
income tax, the 2018 proposal used revenue to reduce GHG emissions 
through investments in clean energy, energy efficiency, and 
transportation.46  
B. Clean Air Act Regulations and Clean Energy Targets 
The domestic climate policy debate has been in disarray since 
Congress failed to enact the 2009 Waxman–Markey Bill. The Obama 
Administration turned to regulatory measures to address GHG 
emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA), a process that abruptly ended 
with the election of Donald Trump.47 Shortly after taking office, the 
Trump Administration initiated the process for withdrawing from the 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, H.R. 7173, 115th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (2018); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791, 115th Cong., 
2d Sess. (2018). 
 44 Washington Initiative 732—Create Carbon Emission Tax—Results: Rejected, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/W4Q3-HGKT; Washington Election Results, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/XRR8-PVMJ.  
 45 Initiative Measure No. 732, § 2 (Wash. 2015), https://perma.cc/NER6-D2LC. 
 46 Initiative Measure No. 1631, § 4 (Wash. 2018), https://perma.cc/S7A5-RGQC.  
 47 Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/JDC6-SNY4 (last updated June 19, 2019); Repeal of the Clean 
Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 
Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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Paris Agreement and is undoing many of the Obama-era CAA 
regulations targeting GHG emissions.48 
The Obama-era Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) efforts 
culminated with the Clean Power Plan, which targeted GHG emissions 
from existing power plants.49 The rule created state-specific emissions 
targets calculated based on three criteria: improving efficiency at 
existing coal-fired power plants; increasing the use of existing natural 
gas facilities; and increasing or maintaining generation from zero-
emitting sources (including renewable and nuclear facilities).50 The 
Clean Power Plan granted states wide latitude to develop their own 
plans to meet the targets. The rule included incentives for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency investments in low-income communities, as 
well as instructions for states to consider environmental justice impacts 
of their compliance plans, but the CAA limited the EPA’s ability to 
otherwise address other policy goals.  
The rule did not require states to adopt market mechanisms in 
their respective compliance plans, but it did identify trading as an 
option and outlined two trading options—one based directly on carbon 
dioxide emissions and one based on power plant heat-rate efficiency. 
The Obama administration also adopted CAA rules targeting GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles and other stationary sources. These rules 
did not include the same degree of compliance flexibility as the Clean 
Power Plan, nor did they aim to address distributional impacts of the 
policies or drive investment in specific communities. 
State renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) mandate renewable 
energy generation.51 These policies may support state GHG reduction 
goals, but the RPS requirements are generally not directly linked to 
GHG emission targets. Some states have opted for clean energy 
standards rather than renewable portfolio standards to incorporate 
incentives for carbon capture technologies and nuclear energy.52 Other 
 
 48 What is the Paris Climate Agreement, UNFCC,  https://perma.cc/Q4LC-XKLM (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2020); see Lisa Friedman, Trump Administration to Begin Official 
Withdrawal From Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019) https://perma.cc/22S5-
VH3E (discussing the Trump Administration’s initiation of the formal process to remove 
the United States from the Paris Climate Accord); Carol Davenport, Trump to Revoke 
California’s Authority to Set Stricter Auto Emission Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019) 
https://perma.cc/BU59-74Z2 (discussing the Trump Administration’s rollback of the 
Obama-era Clean Air standards, specifically the revocation of the waiver granted to 
California allowing the enactment of stricter standards at the state level). 
 49 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Final Rule (Clean Power Plan), 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661–64,662 (Oct. 
23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 50 Jeremy M. Tarr & David Hoppock, Apples and Oranges: Assessing the Stringency of 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,079, 11,080 (2014). 
 51 Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 
2012), https://perma.cc/F27D-BYXM.  
 52 See, e.g., Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard (N.Y. Clean Energy Standard), 
N.Y. P.S.C. Op. No. 15-E-0302, at 3, 13–14, 19–20 (2016) https://perma.cc/4F9G-MRTB.  
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states have revised renewable energy mandates to require significantly 
higher rates of renewable generation.53  
A growing number of states with RPSs, including some that 
participate in state-based carbon markets, are also implementing new 
policy mandates and targets to reduce their respective GHG emissions. 
Some in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest have recently 
implemented Zero Emission Credit programs requiring load-serving 
entities to compensate economically vulnerable nuclear power plants for 
the attribute of zero-carbon baseload electricity generation.54 Seven 
states and the District of Columbia announced GHG-reduction targets 
in 2019, committing to carbon neutral electricity sectors between 2040 
and 2050.55 This group of states has not identified specifically how they 
will achieve the targets, but they will depend in part on aggressive 
RPSs. 
C. The Green New Deal 
The GND dwarfs each of the policies described in the preceding 
subsections in terms of scope, emission reduction ambition, and 
timeline. Nonetheless, the framework outlined by Representative 
Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey shares traits with many of them. 
Like the GND, the Waxman–Markey Bill sought to reduce emissions 
throughout the U.S. economy rather than focusing on a specific sector 
and included both environmental and social goals.56 Both approaches 
would include funding to support technology innovation, help coal-
dependent communities mitigate job losses, and link energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, and climate policies under one umbrella. The Clean 
Power Plan incentivized investments in low-income areas and required 
states to consider environmental justice concerns when developing 
compliance plans—again a far cry from the ambition of the GND but 
still an example of incorporating social justice concerns into climate 
mitigation measures.  
 
 53 GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS: 2019 ANNUAL STATUS UPDATE 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/SXN4-JHRB (noting 
that “ten states enacted higher RPS targets”).  
 54 See, e.g., N.Y. Clean Energy Standard, N.Y. P.S.C. Op. No. 15-E-0302, at 20; Illinois 
Power Agency Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (2018); An Act Concerning Zero 
Carbon Solicitation and Procurement, S.B. 1501, Sess. Year 2017, June Spec. Sess., Pub. 
Act No. 17-3 § 1(1)(d)–(e) (Conn. 2017).  
 55 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Maine and New York Become the 6th and 7th States to 
Adopt 100% Clean Electricity Targets, EIA.GOV (Sept. 26, 2019) https://perma.cc/XUA3-
PWEN; Executive Order B-55-18 to Achieve Carbon Neutrality (Cal. Sept. 10, 2018); Fact 
Sheet: State and Utility Climate Change Targets Shift to Carbon Reductions, Technology 
Diversity, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE (May 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/3BP9-LUR7; Robert 
Walton, Hawaii First State to Enact 100% Carbon Neutral Goal, UTIL. DIVE (June 5, 
2018), https://perma.cc/Q5NV-8TB3/.  
 56 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702 
(2009).  
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The GND is perhaps most similar to state carbon neutrality goals. 
The state timelines are longer than the GND—aiming for carbon 
neutrality between 2040 and 2050 rather than the GND’s 10-year goal—
but the states and the GND set specific targets that depend upon 
technologies that do not currently exist.  
Yet the carbon pricing and regulatory mandates discussed here are 
traditional environmental laws at heart. Their primary, or sole, aim is 
to reduce pollution. The GND is as much “new deal” as it is “green.” It 
redefines the climate challenge as something larger than environmental 
policy. In doing so, the GND also challenges the traditional approaches 
to carbon reductions, both in terms of scope and stringency.  
IV. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CLIMATE POLICY 
Decarbonization policy substitutes for, or significantly alters, many 
existing policies. Decarbonization may function as energy policy by 
influencing the means by which we produce and consume energy. 
Decarbonization may function as transportation policy by changing 
automobile technologies, altering transportation options, or lowering the 
carbon content of fuels.57 Carbon offset markets may function as 
agriculture policy, providing incentives for farmers to adopt new 
practices or set aside land for conservation. These are explicit strategies 
designed to target major sources of GHG emissions.  
Decarbonization may take the form of international trade policy. 
Many federal proposals seek to protect certain industries vulnerable to 
international competition from businesses not subject to a carbon price, 
for example.58 The Waxman–Markey Bill included specific provisions to 
protect “energy intensive, trade-exposed” industries, as well as border 
tax adjustments.59 The CLC carbon dividend proposal adopts the border 
tax adjustment approach as one of its four core elements.60 Climate 
policy may also provide a platform for nations to achieve other 
international relations goals.61 
Decarbonization policies also often include elements of industrial 
policy, as they provide incentives to develop new economic sectors and 
transform technologies used in other sectors.62 The timing of emission 
 
 57 Compliance Offset Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Oct. 20, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/7XMR-8QNS (providing links to carbon offset protocols). 
 58 See, e.g., CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3, § 4.  
 59 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 782(e) 
(2009).  
 60 CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3, § 4. 
 61 Matthew Ranson & Robert N. Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture 
Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 426 (2013); Robert O. 
Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 18 (Harvard Project 
on Int’l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 10-33, 2010).  
 62 See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 39, at 4 (“Exports by companies in sectors with 
greater than 5% energy cost in final value should have any carbon taxes rebated on 
leaving the United States. Finally, non-emissive fossil fuel products (e.g. asphalt for road 
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reduction requirements may also have direct industrial policy 
implications. A rapid transition would likely have a much greater cost, 
lock in use of existing technologies, cause rapid job losses in some 
sectors and create jobs in other sectors.  
This Part focuses on three cross-cutting categories that are often 
not treated as core goals of decarbonization, but where disagreement 
may pose barriers to reaching consensus on climate policy proposals: 
technology policy, social justice policy, and fiscal policy. 
A. Decarbonization as Technology Policy 
The technology policy debate breaks down along two fault lines:  
1) whether climate policy should promote renewable energy or “clean” 
energy and 2) how to incentivize investments in innovative technologies. 
The “renewables versus clean” distinction turns on whether a low 
carbon future should include nuclear energy or fossil fuel-fired 
generation with carbon capture.63 A growing number of states are 
implementing renewable or clean energy mandates. This is already a 
major factor in GND discussions and could sway some stakeholders’ 
opinions about the wisdom of the GND approach generally.64 States are 
also taking different approaches to the question, with some 
implementing aggressive new renewable energy mandates and others 
adopting clean energy mandates.65  
A key trait of carbon taxes and carbon markets is compliance 
flexibility. The focus is on emissions, not the technologies that are 
deployed. These approaches are agnostic regarding the “renewables 
versus clean” argument. Even though carbon pricing schemes do not 
mandate renewable energy, they create favorable economic conditions 
for lower carbon forms of energy. They may operate in parallel with 
technology incentives or mandates. For example, the Waxman–Markey 
Bill combined a carbon market, a national renewable portfolio standard, 
and technology funding in a single legislative package.66 Although New 
York is part of the RGGI carbon market, the state also utilizes a Zero 
 
use) should be exempt, with a refund for any tax previously paid.”); Jonas Meckling et al., 
Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCI. 1170, 1171 (2015) (discussing incentives 
for green industrial policy). 
 63 See, e.g., Joshua S. Goldstein & Staffan A. Qvist, Only Nuclear Energy Can Save the 
Planet, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/C2UK-C4R3; Jesse Jenkins & Samuel 
Thernstrom, We Need More Than Solar and Wind to Power the Green New Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/WEY6-757J. 
 64 Dino Granini, The Energy 202, The Green New Deal Is Already Sparking Debate over 
Nuclear Energy, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/FXW2-A8YR. 
 65 See, e.g., Iulia Gheorgiu, As 100% Renewables Mandate Nears, Puerto Rico Sees New 
Microgrid Initiative, Resilience Focus, UTIL. DRIVE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/5QZQ-
TMJK; Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, N.Y., Governor Cuomo Announces 
Establishment of Clean Energy Standard that Mandates 50 Percent Renewables by 2030 
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/EV7Y-QQRM.  
 66 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman–Markey Bill), H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong. tit. I, III (2009). 
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Emission Credit program to help keep existing nuclear plants 
economically-viable in the state’s electricity market.67 Similarly, New 
York and California recently announced ambitious new renewable 
energy requirements for the electricity grid operators in their respective 
states.68 These requirements operate in parallel with the RGGI and 
California carbon markets.  
Renewable energy mandates and some GND proposals treat the 
makeup of the energy generation mix as a central feature of 
decarbonization policy rather than as a means by which to achieve the 
goal of decarbonization. As noted above, the initial GND framework 
called for “meeting 100% of national power demand through renewable 
sources.”69 The language in the Ocasio-Cortez-Markey resolution is more 
ambiguous. The resolution does not discuss nuclear power, instead 
calling for “meeting 100 percent of [U.S. energy needs] through clean, 
renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.”70 The resolution’s 
language leaves the door open to nuclear and other non-renewable low 
carbon technology options, but the issue is, thus far, not resolved among 
proponents of the GND.71 
There is more common ground regarding technology innovation, as 
it is an important part of any serious climate policy strategy.72 
Furthermore, a constraint on emissions may induce firms to invest in 
new technologies to reduce costs.73 The line between technology 
mandates versus incentives and flexibility is thus less stark than the 
renewables versus clean debate discussed above. Nonetheless, there are 
important differences of opinion regarding the appropriate strategies to 
promote innovation. 
The CLC Carbon Dividend Plan relies solely on the carbon price to 
incentivize investments in low carbon technologies.74 Including 
predictable increases in the carbon tax policy allows businesses subject 
to the tax to make long-term investments to reduce emissions, and thus 
 
 67 N.Y. Clean Energy Standard, N.Y. P.S.C. Or. No. 15-E-0302, at 3, 13–14 (2016).  
 68 N.Y. 2019 STATE OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 313–15. California now requires 
fifty-percent renewable energy by 2030. Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 
2015, S.B. 350, ch. 547 (Ca. 2015).  
 69 DRAFT TEXT FOR PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO HOUSE RULES FOR 116TH CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, § 6(A)(i). 
 70 Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND Resolution, supra note 18, at 7. 
 71 See, e.g., Jeff Brady, Transcript, Despite Few Details and Much Doubt, The Green 
New Deal Generates Enthusiasm, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/6RBM-
U38P (“Green New Deal backers say they also want to eventually phase out nuclear 
energy.”). 
 72 Joseph P. Tomain, “Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment”: Regulating Energy 
Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 392–93 (2011).  
 73 David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641, 644 (2003). 
 74 BAKER ET AL., supra note 39, at 1–2 (claiming that a $40 per ton carbon tax would 
“send a powerful market signal that encourages technological innovation and largescale 
substitution of existing energy and transportation infrastructures, thereby stimulating 
new investment”).  
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reduce compliance costs. This, in turn, incentivizes investments in new 
energy technologies, as well as efficiency improvements. Returning all 
revenue to citizens rather than using at least a portion of the carbon tax 
payments to fund technology research, financial incentives, subsidies, or 
direct purchases may leave critical gaps in the technology development 
pipeline unless sufficient funding for research, development, and 
deployment are available through other government programs.75 
B. Decarbonization as Social Justice Policy 
A core premise of the GND is that addressing climate change 
requires addressing broader socioeconomic challenges. The U.S. 
electricity sector is already moving away from coal in favor of natural 
gas and renewable energy, resulting in public health and environmental 
benefits, but also causing job losses in coal-dependent communities.76 
Accelerating a move to clean energy will increase job losses unless 
federal and state policymakers address the problem. The GND calls for 
“achiev[ing] net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just 
transition for all communities and workers,”77 seeking to correct past 
social and environmental burdens and avoid creating new burdens in 
the process.78 This approach includes, but is not limited to, 
environmental policy concerns.79  
No other policies included in this Essay go as far as the GND to 
address social justice concerns, but each of them considers at least the 
direct economic impacts of the new policy, and some go well beyond the 
direct economic impacts to address other social impacts. The social 
justice provisions in some of the programs included in this section—
particularly the Clean Power Plan—are limited because the authorizing 
statute focuses on pollution control but does not authorize the agency to 
directly address justice concerns. Others, such as RGGI, are limited 
because they focus on one sector. The recent carbon tax, cap-and-
dividend, and GND proposals are not constrained by preexisting policy 
constraints. Instead, they demonstrate the continuing disagreements 
regarding the meaning of social justice, the role of climate policy in 
addressing the justice needs, and the proper balance between social 
justice concerns and other climate policy goals. 
 
 75 Current examples of technology innovation policies that support GHG emission-
reduction goals include the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-
Energy (ARPA-E), renewable energy tax credits, and numerous funding opportunities for 
technology research and development. See, e.g., ARPA-E.GOV, https://perma.cc/AKS9-
H7B9 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020); 2017 Renewable Energy Tax Credits, ENERGY STAR, 
https://perma.cc/UP5J-UCDB (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).  
 76 See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 7, at 3–7. 
 77 Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND Resolution, supra note 18, at 5.  
 78 Darren McCauley & Raphael Heffron, Just Transition: Integrating Climate, Energy 
and Environmental Justice, ENERGY POL’Y, Aug. 2018, at 1. 
 79 Alice Kaswan, Expanding Environmental Justice to Achieve a Just Transition, 
REGULATORY REVIEW (Sept. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/2WS2-AP5J.  
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As noted previously, the Waxman–Markey Bill included numerous 
provisions to address the impacts of higher energy prices on low income 
citizens, the geographic disparities in the energy mix, and the inevitable 
job losses that would result from a move to a lower carbon economy.80 
Some stakeholders criticized the Waxman–Markey approach due to its 
reliance on emissions trading.81 The bill sought to steer the U.S. 
economy to a low carbon future, but it did not include specific provisions 
to ensure that the energy transition reduced pollution in burdened 
communities. Large emitters of GHGs would have to reduce emissions 
or purchase allowances, but carbon markets leave those decisions to the 
individual operators.  
If the federal climate debate was not sufficiently responsive to 
environmental justice critiques, the arguments have had much more 
resonance in California. The statute authorizing California’s Cap-and-
Trade Program included both substantive and procedural requirements 
to address environmental justice concerns about pollution hot spots and 
ensuring that the program delivers economic benefits to disadvantaged 
communities. 82 
The CAA limited the EPA’s options for incorporating social justice 
considerations in the 2015 Clean Power Plan, for example. There was 
ongoing debate, and unresolved lawsuits, challenging what options were 
allowed under the CAA.83 It was clear, however, that the current CAA 
does not authorize EPA to collect revenue from a GHG emissions 
trading program and use the funds to target social justice goals. Instead, 
the EPA required states to engage vulnerable communities during the 
rule development process.84 The Clean Power Plan also included an 
optional Clean Energy Incentive Program that, inter alia, encouraged 
energy efficiency investments in low-income communities to distribute 
the rule’s benefits.85 The EPA was criticized by some environmental 
 
 80 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 264 
(2009). 
 81 Bryan Walsh, What the Energy Bill Really Means for Co2 Emissions, TIME (June 27, 
2009), https://perma.cc/5PW9-CWR6. 
 82 Alice Kaswan, A Broader Vision for Climate Policy: Lessons from California, 9 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 83, 88–92 (2018).  
 83 LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480, CLEAN 
POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA 
(Mar. 8, 2017).  
 84 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,670 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R pt. 60). (requiring states to “include in their initial submittals a description of how 
they engaged with vulnerable communities as they developed their initial submittals, as 
well as the means by which they intend to involve communities and other stakeholders as 
they develop their final plans”) (hereinafter CPP Final Rule); Executive Order 12,898 
instructs federal agencies to “make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by 
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human 
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations.” Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994). 
 85 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,829. 
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justice advocates for allowing emissions trading as a compliance 
option.86  
Carbon tax proposals focus primarily on mitigating GHG emissions 
and, to varying degrees, mitigating the economic impacts of the policies 
on vulnerable citizens or business sectors.  
For example, the CLC Carbon Dividend Plan does not address 
social justice directly, but the proposal notes that a greater portion of 
dividend payments would flow to lower income households, thus 
redistributing carbon tax revenue and potentially helping those families 
cope with higher energy costs.87 The 2018 Washington State carbon fee 
ballot initiative dedicated five percent of the fee revenue “to prepare 
communities for the impacts of climate change and to help certain 
populations who are particularly affected by climate change.”88 
The RGGI carbon market similarly does not address the burdens 
placed on communities near power plants, nor does it provide direct 
funding to address social issues. The states participating in the RGGI 
market do direct a large portion of their respective share of the auction 
revenue to support energy efficiency improvements to reduce energy 
bills, however.89 These different policy approaches highlight two lessons 
for decarbonization and social justice. First, and most obviously, there is 
no consensus about incorporating social goals into decarbonization 
strategies to begin with. Some policies address direct economic impacts 
of higher energy prices or job losses. Others take a much broader 
approach.  
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, there is not agreement 
about the scope of social goals among stakeholders that support 
incorporating justice concerns in climate policy. Environmental justice 
advocates remain some of the strongest critics of market mechanisms, 
which may put them at odds with consumer protection advocates 
seeking to minimize the cost of reducing GHG emissions.90 Climate 
policy may create distributional impacts, placing higher costs and 
burdens on certain communities or regions of the country.91 Other 
stakeholders and scholars argue for focusing on energy justice or climate 
 
 86 See, e.g., Emily Holden, Inside the Uphill Battle Against Carbon Trading, E&E 
NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/F5HC-EZ2V.  
 87 SCHULTZ & HALSTEAD, supra note 9, at 3. 
 88 Initiative Measure No. 1631, VOTERS’ GUIDE 2018 GEN. ELECTION, 
https://perma.cc/PXV7-87P3 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 89 REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, THE INVESTMENTS OF RGGI PROCEEDS IN 2016, 
at 3 (2018) (“Energy efficiency makes up 55 percent of 2016 RGGI investments and 58 
percent of cumulative investments. Programs funded by these investments in 2016 are 
expected to return $822.8 million in lifetime energy bill savings to over 176,000 
participating households and 2,430 businesses in the region.”). 
 90 Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring Pope 
Francis’ Challenge, 80 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 135, 147–52 (2017). 
 91 See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus 
Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293, 304 (2010) (discussing the distributional impacts of carbon 
markets and carbon taxes).  
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justice, in addition to other social concerns.92 This is not to suggest that 
each of these framings of social and environmental justice are 
necessarily at odds with one another, but it is important to recognize 
that general agreement about the need to address the social impacts of 
climate and energy policy does not lead to a single outcome.  
C. Decarbonization as Fiscal Policy 
A third source of conflict among the policies discussed in this Essay 
is whether climate policy instruments should generate government 
revenue and, if so, whether it should fund climate-related government 
programs or enter the general government coffers. For example, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Waxman–Markey Bill 
would have “[i]ncrease[d] federal revenues by about $846 billion[] and 
[i]ncrease[d] direct spending by about $821 billion,” resulting in an 
estimated $24 billion surplus between 2009 and 2019.93 The bill 
allocated the auction revenue to, inter alia, help low- and moderate-
income households with energy costs, prevent international 
deforestation, fund domestic and international adaptation efforts, 
support research and development of new technologies, and help U.S. 
workers transition away from fossil fuel-dependent industries.94 
Opponents criticized the bill as simply creating a new big government 
program rather than staying tightly focused on mitigating climate 
change.95  
The RGGI carbon market generates auction revenue for the 
participating states.96 The states generally use the revenue to support 
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and low-income assistance 
programs, but that is not required in order to participate in the RGGI 
program.97 
The debate also plays out among carbon tax proponents. Some 
argue that a carbon tax should replace a federal payroll tax or be used to 
supplement federal taxes to fill budget gaps and control the deficit.98 
 
 92 Kirsten Jenkins, Setting Energy Justice Apart from the Crowd: Lessons from 
Environmental and Climate Justice, 39 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 117, 118 (2018); 
Environmental & Climate Justice, NAACP, https://perma.cc/ZAE7-W5LL (last visited Jan. 
25, 2020) (distinguishing between “climate justice” and “environmental justice,” and 
providing examples of the interaction between the two concepts); Maxine Burkett, Just 
Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for A Domestic Clean 
Development Mechanism, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 169, 188–92 (2008). 
 93 Waxman–Markey Bill, supra note 31, at 359. 
 94 Id. at 89. 
 95 See, e.g., Rich Lowry, The Waxman-Markey Travesty, NAT’L. REV. (June 30, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/R37P-KPU7 (accusing the architects of the Waxman–Markey Bill of using 
auction revenue to “[buy] off every possible interest group”). 
 96 Elements of RGGI, RGGI (2019), https://perma.cc/FET9-GS3S. 
 97 Id.  
 98 JERRY TAYLOR, NISKANEN CTR., THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX (Mar. 
23, 2015), https://perma.cc/72E3-9HXY; Gore Says Tax Pollution, Not Payrolls, ENVTL. 
NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 19, 2006), https://perma.cc/FLP5-U7GB.  
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Republican Representative Carlos Curbelo introduced a carbon tax bill 
in 2015 that would use the revenue to replace the federal excise tax on 
gasoline and diesel.99 As noted above, the revenue neutral carbon 
dividend approach would return carbon tax revenue to citizens rather 
than creating government revenue.  
The GND does not identify funding strategies for the expansive new 
government programs.100 Promoting technology, helping low income 
communities cope with higher energy prices, providing job guarantees, 
and moving the country rapidly to a low-carbon future will require 
major public and private sector investments. Climate mitigation policies 
do not have to create the revenue necessary to implement the policies. 
Indeed, many government programs rely on general tax dollars rather 
than generate funds themselves. Representative Ocasio-Cortez 
suggested that a new wealth tax could fund GND policies.101  
Disputes over the fiscal aspects of a climate policy may be more 
impactful than the disputes over technology policies or social justice 
policies. There could be compromises on technology and social justice. In 
contrast, funding new climate and social policies through general tax 
revenues, or funding them with government revenues at all, may prove 
to be a dealbreaker for advocates of revenue-neutral policies. Other 
stakeholders may reject climate policy options that do not include 
funding to support technology research and development or address the 
social and economic impacts of the policy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The GND does not resolve the conflicts identified in this Essay. Yet, 
the framework has already made an important contribution by changing 
the narrative about climate policy in 2019.102 Rather than dismissing 
climate change as a national problem, many policymakers and 
stakeholders responded to the GND proposal by debating questions such 
as whether ten years is too quick to transform the energy sector or 
whether nuclear energy has a role in a low carbon future.103 The Ocasio-
Cortez–Markey Resolution earned 98 cosponsors in the House of 
Representatives and, as noted above, many Democratic presidential 
 
 99 Noah Kaufman et al., Emission, Energy, and Economic Implications of the Curbelo 
Carbon Tax Proposal (Columbia SIPA, Ctr. on Glob. Pol’y Working Paper, 2018),  
https://perma.cc/V8DZ-SUSV.  
 100 Republican opponents of the GND cite a cost of $93 trillion, even though the number 
has no basis and the GND remains a concept rather than a specific proposal. Zack 
Colman, The Bogus Number at the Center of the GOP’s Green New Deal Attacks, POLITICO 
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/B9HY-ASRF.  
 101 Tom DiChristopher, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Floats 70% Tax on Wealthy to Pay for 
‘Green New Deal, CNBC (Jan. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/TQ3K-ZX9P.  
 102 Grandoni, supra note 11.  
 103 See, e.g., John Cassidy, The Good News about a Green New Deal, NEW YORKER (Mar. 
4, 2019), https://perma.cc/4YGX-YVLL.  
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candidates endorsed the GND concept.104 Mitigating climate change will 
require much more than a non-binding resolution, white papers, and 
editorials, but the GND may prove to be a critical step in creating a 
policy window to address the policy conflicts that have frustrated 
adoption of federal climate legislation. 
Starting with a broad vision about social justice and environmental 
policy, rather than focusing on political viability at the outset, has 
helped the GND earn the attention of the media and stakeholders. It 
reframes climate change as a critical social challenge rather than simply 
an environmental problem. Expanding the policy goals GHG reductions 
could allow engaging different constituencies with different arguments. 
Stakeholders could see tangible benefits in terms of jobs, reduced 
burdens from local pollution (due to retiring fossil fuel-fired power 
plants), and greater opportunities for directing the future of their 
respective communities (via the just transition emphasis).  
An important question for GND proponents is whether they will 
insist on achieving all of the goals at one time. The strategic choice to 
present the GND as a package of general ideas rather than specific 
policy proposals creates the opportunity to find consensus among 
supporters of climate policy. The original New Deal did not come about 
via one statute and it is likely that any elements of the GND that 
become law would do so through different statutes, as well.  
GND proponents may be able to find common ground on some 
provisions while agreeing to hold other issues for later debates. For 
example, carbon pricing can play a role in a broader social and 
environmental policy framework or it can be deployed in a narrower 
manner focusing on a particular sector or in a policy approach that 
focuses solely, or primarily, at carbon pollution. A conservative think 
tank argues for incorporating a carbon tax into the GND,105 and a 
former Obama Administration official argues that a carbon tax 
approach is “the original GND.”106 The proponents of the CLC Carbon 
Dividend Plan or the GND may still engage in discussions about the 
merits of carbon pricing and potentially reach agreement on at least one 
aspect of a comprehensive climate mitigation strategy. Other coalitions 
could emerge to pursue other social justice and environmental goals. 
There is also an inherent tension between the rapid 
decarbonization called for in the GND, inclusive community 
participation, environmental protection, and procedural and corrective 
justice goals.107 How willing would GND proponents be to compromise 
 
 104 Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND Resolution, supra note 18. 
 105 Ed Dolan, A Carbon Tax Should Be the Centerpiece of the GND, NISKANEN CTR. 
(Feb. 5, 2019),  https://perma.cc/55LE-FXUC. 
 106 Steven Rattner, Opinion, Yes, We Need a Green New Deal. Just Not the One 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is Offering, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/7SPG-
DJAT. 
 107 J.B. Ruhl, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, AM. 
COLL. OF ENVTL. LAWYERS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/FTY3-ATSS. 
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on procedural protections such as streamlining NEPA, the purpose of 
which is to examine environmental impacts in detail before acting, 
which is the opposite of moving quickly? Involving local communities in 
decisions that will affect their futures is important, but it is also time-
consuming. If urgent action is the priority, that tension must be 
addressed. 
But the hard questions are not reserved only for GND proponents. 
Climate policies, including a revenue neutral carbon tax, aim to speed 
the transition to clean energy technologies. People are already losing 
jobs throughout the coal value chain—coal mines, coal-fired power 
plants, and rail.108 If alternatives to the GND do not recognize that the 
energy transition is an economic transition, they will likely continue to 
struggle with building the types of coalitions necessary to adopt new 
legislation. Furthermore, if they do manage to achieve new legislation,  
relying on a carbon price may be insufficient to support the type of 
research and development necessary to achieve breakthrough energy 
technologies.  
These disagreements do not alter the fundamental facts about 
climate change. Global GHG emissions continue to rise, and a steady 
stream of academic studies point to alarming impacts of unabated 
emission increases.109 The failure to address climate change will 
undoubtedly create profound social impacts. While stakeholders may 
support different end goals, the emergence of the GND and new carbon 
pricing proposals are a refreshing change from the stalemate of the past 
decade and could create opportunities to resolve the disputes that have 
created barriers to an effective national climate policy. 
 
 
 108 BLUMENTHAL, supra note 7. 
 109 IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et 
al. eds., 2018).  
